So ellipsis sites have been variously described in the literature as free or bound proforms but not, to my knowledge, as potentially both. But why should this be the case? NP anaphora is generally recognized to occur in (at least) two distinct ways: (1) via socalled "accidental" (i.e. free) coreference and (2) via argument-reductive variable binding (cf. the Derived VP rule of eg. Partee (1975) and Sag (1976) ). This "ambiguity" explains a great deal about, inter alia, the possible semantics of constructions with quantificational antecedents (i.e. every man i loves his i/j mother), the existence of both strict and sloppy identity of pronouns in elided VPs (i.e. the two readings of Bill i loves his i mother, and John does too-cf. Sag (1976) ), and the semantics of sentences with focused e-type pronominal antecedents (i.e. the two readings of only SUE i thinks she i is smart). Although English (and probably natural language in general) lacks quantificational pro-verb antecedents, I argue, using constructions from Schwarz (2000) as well as new data, that analogs of the latter two phenomena suggest the existence of both free and bound pro-verbs in English.
This paper begins with an introduction to the Jacobson (1999) variable-free approach to anaphora resolution. It continues with a short exegesis of Jacobson (and Hardt)'s free anaphora mechanisms for VPE resolution and contrasts them with Szabolcsi (1992) 's binding approach. I present the traditional problem posed by ACD along with the canonical QR solution (cf. May (1985) ) and subsequently describe Jacobson's Hardt-like but (importantly) variable-free rejoinder. I next offer a binding account of ACD resolution which is a feature of (a generalized form of) the variable-free logic of Jacobson (1999) -and indeed of other Combinatory Categorial Grammars. This treatment complements the Jacobson (1992b) and Szabolcsi (1992) accounts and underscores the formal similarities between pro-verbs and their pronominal counterparts.
It is further shown that the focus-related insights of Kratzer (1991) and Schwarz (2000) which suggest a binding relationship between VP antecedent and ellipsis site in certain VPE constructions-can be straightforwardly accommodated with the apparatus sketched out here. Certain syntactic configurations will require an additional piece of machinery-Curry and Feys's S combinator, which has been argued to be independently motivated by Barker (2005) and Steedman (1987) (among others) to account for binding out of DP and parasitic gaps, respectively. In providing this account, I show that these data in no way necessitate a QR or focus-indexed analysis of this binding relationship. It is additionally proposed that sentences with intuitively "n-complex" gaps may in fact be analyzed as n-place functions.
I highlight a new set of VPE constructions evincing what I call a "free focus" reading analogous to the unbound reading of only SUE i thinks she i is smart (i.e. such that Sue is the only x such that x thinks Sue is smart). These constructions, I argue, force us to acknowledge that an elided VP may or may not carry focus marking in cases where its antecedent does. The bound versus free distinction emerges as an elegant way to think about this. The paper concludes with a binding account of so-called across-the-board (ATB) VPE and ACD constructions.
2 Free and bound NP anaphora in Jacobson (1999) 2.1 A note on notation and CCG Combinatory Categorial Grammar hypothesizes a transparent link between a lexical item's syntactic distribution and semantic argument structure. In CCG, how a lexical item distributes is encoded in its syntactic category, which is closely isomorphic to its functional denotation. When some lexical functor receives its argument directly in the syntax-i.e. immediately to its right or left-the two strings concatenate, and the denotation of the resulting constituent is arrived at via the semantics of function application (FA):
A/B denotes a function which takes a constituent of category B to its right to yield a constituent of category A. A\B denotes a function which takes a constituent of category B to its left to yield a constituent of category A. In other words, in the notation adopted here arguments always occur to the right of the slash, and the direction in which the slash leans indicates whether the functor "wants" its argument to its right or left.
Geach and lift
The variable-free account of anaphora detailed in Jacobson (1999) treats pro-forms as constituents which host gapped/missing meanings but which distribute (more or less) exactly like their non-gapped counterparts.
5 So a constituent A B distributes exactly like an A but has the semantics of an A/B-which is to say it's "missing" an argument of category B.
Jacobson uses the geach operator (g)-a unarized version of Curry and Feys's B-to allow functors to inherit missing/gapped meanings from their arguments. Geaching allows every functor which wants an A to its right or left to instead take an A B (or A/B, where the slash here is variable) and subsequently to "pass up" the missing B meaning while preserving the directionality in which B is sought. Since gabc = a(bc), g is nothing but a unarized, Curry'd version of function composition. Like other CCG frameworks, Jacobson (1999) uses the lift operation T which reverses the function-argument relationship between some functor f and some argument a:
Together, T and g allow pronominal meanings to be passed up repeatedly, all the way to the level of the sentence. An example derivation follows for a case of pronominal anaphora:
5 "More or less" since there exist other constraints on the distribution of pronominals such as e.g. Condition B of the classical binding theory.
6 I will use g throughout when I need a unarized function compositional shift rule-which is to say in cases where there aren't actually two adjacent constituents composing-and B to facilitate function composition between two adjacent constituents. The two operators, however, are at heart the same.
7 T is unarized here; nothing here, I believe, hinges on this. In general, at any step in a derivation, if an unbound pronominal meaning (i.e. a superscript) is present in a "potential" argument of some functor f -which is to say, in a constituent which is a gapped meaning away from being the appropriate type to serve as input to f -g applies to f in order to resolve a type and category mismatch. In the above derivation, this allows likes and him to form a constituent likes him, a VP with an e-type gap-i.e. a VP NP . If, on the other hand, f itself hosts a gap-say, for instance, f is of category (A\B) C and occurs to the right of a B-B will lift over constituent of category A\B to yield a constituent of category A/(A\B). The geach rule then applies to yield a constituent of category A C /(A\B) C , and the two constituents combine to yield an A C . This is the same operation as "applying inside" and allows John to combine with loves him in the above derivation. These two operations-geach and lift+geach-allow any otherwise well-formed sentence with an unbound pro-form of category X to compose up to an S X . Here John likes him denotes a property characterizing the set of individuals x such that John likes x. The processor receives this model-theoretic object from the grammar and applies it to a contextually salient individual to yield a proposition.
Binding
Jacobson (1999) deploys the z operator, an argument reductive unary shift rule, to semantically bind pronominals to their antecedents. The z rule applies directly to verbs rather than full VPs and, as such, is a more local, variable-free analog of the Derived VP rule:
The z rule
If a constituent X is looking for a C and instead finds itself adjacent to a C B , it could shift by g, combine with the C B , and pass up the free pro-form B. Alternatively, X could shift by z, which like g allows it to combine with a C B but, unlike g, binds the pronominal to z(X)(C B )'s next argument slot. An example derivation follows for a case of quantificational pronominal binding: (2) Every man i likes his i mother. 8 The slashes here are intended as having variable directionality. However, as the notation makes clear, z preserves directionality between its input and output.
9 The relative locality of z-i.e. its ability to apply to transitive relations rather than whole VPs-is argued in Jacobson (1996) to be a major point in its favor over the Derived VP rule, specifically with respect to across-the-board (ATB) binding configurations. The interested reader is referred to Jacobson's paper for details. Jacobson (1992b) allows the auxiliary did to shift from category VP/VP-which is to say from a rightward-looking VP modifier-to category VP VP -the corresponding pro-form. Such a move is justified since the distribution of gapped auxiliaries seems intuitively close to that of full VPs:
Every man
Lift and geach allow the missing VP-type meaning to continue being passed up all the way to the level of the sentence, exactly analogously to how the superscripted NP percolated up in the free derivation of John likes him. Example (3) is consequently of category S VP and type et, t and denotes a function from contextually salient VP-type meanings to propositions. In most contexts, the denotation of eat a doughnut will, by virtue of being the most discourse-recent e, t -type meaning (modulo past tense), be the most salient way to "fill in" the unbound pro-VP.
Jacobson (1992b)'s anaphora account of VPE is a variable-free relative of Hardt (1993) 's anaphora proposal. In particular, Hardt treats the ellipsis site as a silent variable P over e, t meanings. Both frameworks analyze VP ellipsis as free anaphora. Ellipsis resolution, then, involves semantically identifying-i.e. co-indexing-P with some appropriate antecedent meaning. The interested reader is referred to Hardt's paper for further details. Szabolcsi (1992) shows that VPE may in certain configurations be analyzed using argumentreductive binding. Szabolcsi adopts Curry and Feys's W combinator as her argument reducer. In fact, both z and W work more or less isomorphically to explain the full range of Szabolcsi's cases. I adopt z here solely for expository reasons.
VPE as bound anaphora
In Szabolcsi's account-augmented here with the language of Jacobson (1992b)'s anaphora treatment of VPE-z may apply to because to yield a constituent C which, instead of looking for a full sentence to its right, looks for a sentence hosting an unbound pro-VP-i.e. an S VP . C binds this pro-VP to its second argument slot: Szabolcsi (1992) presents no other mechanisms for VP ellipsis. This seems undesirable, as VP-type meanings may both be pragmatically controlled and supplied across sentence boundaries, facts which argue against having the gap be obligatorily bound by another VP within the same sentence.
10 In other words, the behavior of pro-VPs seems closer to that of personal pronouns than that of reflexives in that they can remain free within their sentence, an observation which militates against a binding-only account of anaphoric VPE.
4 Antecedent-contained deletion as anaphora
Motivating the standard account
In ACD constructions, an argument of a transitive (or potentially higher-typed) verb hosts a gap understood to be roughly anaphoric to the verb itself:
(5) John will read every book which Bill does ∅.
(5a) John will read [ NP every book which Bill does (read)]
The parenthetical notation reflects the intuition that the quantified NP hosts a "gapped" or silent constituent/meaning which seems to correspond in some way to read.
However, with respect to a "standard" syntactic-semantic framework (i.e., Heim and Kratzer (1998), Government and Binding Theory), we will need to say something more complicated about the syntax and semantics of constructions like (5).
(5b) represents a Heim and Kratzer (1998)-style transformational derivation of (5)'s Sstructure. Which has raised from its D-structure position as argument to the elided read, leaving a co-indexed variable trace in its place. The trace denotes an e-type constituent whose meaning is non-constant over assignment functions g. It follows that every constituent containing this variable while it's unbound-"unbound" in the sense of formal logic-will likewise have a meaning relative to and non-constant over assignment functions g.
The existence of silent traces in the syntax, as above, is ultimately due to an implicit but foundational tenet of the standard theory: the "saturation criterion." Informally, the saturation criterion is a constraint mandating that every functor receive each of its arguments immediately to its right or left in the syntax. In those cases where an argument is not supplied overtly, instantiating silent variable material in its place ensures syntactic well-formedness and semantic interpretability.
11
In (5b), functional abstraction occurs at the CP-node, which consequently denotes an e, t -type meaning-constant over assignments g-characterizing the set of things that Bill does read.
12 Book likewise characterizes a set of e-types, and so the meaning of (5b)'s N-node is a function characterizing the intersection of these two sets.
However, under any imaginable construal of the identity constraint on phonological "deletion" (cf. Sag (1976) and Williams (1977) ), the VP read t 1 lacks an overt linguistic antecedent and should not be subject to ellipsis. In (5b) the only possible antecedent VP-type meaning is read every book which 1 Bill does read t 1 , but positing this constituent as the meaning of the elided VP in lieu of read t 1 sets up an infinite regress known as the antecedent containment paradox.
13
Of course, the standard theory has an elegant out in QR. In the move from S-structure to the input to the semantic module (LF), quantified NPs in object position undergo obligatory QR since they cannot be interpreted in situ. Here the quantified NP raises out of and takes scope over its host sentence:
11 Jacobson (1996) notes, however, that a strict formulation of the saturation criterion is untenable for a variety of reasons (i.e., the semantics of intersective adjectives, common nouns, conjunction, intensionality, and so on) and, other things being equal, should not be construed as strong evidence for the existence of silent material in the syntax. Furthermore, as Jacobson points out, silent material only behaves like "actual" material as long as it needs to. This tends to be up to a point in a derivation where abstracting over the hypothesized variable yields a constituent whose semantic properties are "welcomed" by its sister functor. The interested reader is referred to Jacobson's paper.
12 In fact, positing silent material and then abstracting over it turns out to be almost isomorphic to type-lifting and function composition in CCG and the induction rule of Type-Logical grammars.
13 To observe this, plug read every book which 1 Bill does read t 1 into the parentheses. Now, the only possible antecedent VP-type meaning for ellipsis is read every book which 1 Bill does read every book which 1 Bill does read t 1 , and so on.
Modulo variable indices, read t 1 finds a suitable antecedent at LF in the VP read t 2 . Therefore, if ellipsis licensing applies at LF, QR allows the standard theory to explain ACD in terms of VPE. This is quite a striking result, and in the absence of alternative accounts it would represent strong evidence for abstract levels of syntactic representation and covert QR.
The variable-free CCG account

The CCG account of relative clauses
In CCG, the proper interpretation for relative clauses (leaving aside ACD for the moment) is derived if we allow function composition and type-lifting (cf. Steedman (1987) ). So instead of positing a variable trace in the ellipsis side which is subsequently bound by a λ operator, CCG allows the e-type extraction gap to simply be passed up. This in turn means the sentence with the extraction gap is of category S/NP and type e, t . Its denotation, then, is the perfect sort of meaning to intersect with the denotation of the head noun (here, book)-itself an e, t -type function. In the framework I assume here, the job of intersection is built into the semantics of the relativizer which.
14 An example derivation follows for the object noun of (5)'s overt counterpart (6): (6) John will read every [ N book which Bill reads]
Free transitive verb anaphora
So CCG abandons the saturation criterion in favor of function composition and type lifting. Crucially, this means that in the CCG framework, there is no full VP-i.e. reads t 1 -sitting in the relative clause of (6)-only the full transitive verb read. What this means for ACD cases like (5)-as pointed out in Jacobson (1992b) -is that the elided meaning can likewise be a transitive relation:
(5 ′ ) John will read i every book which Bill does ∅ i Jacobson (1992b) shows that we can shift pro-form does from a VP VP to a TVP TVP with one application of geach:
Jacobson abbreviates VP/NP as TVP (i.e. transitive verb phrase), a convention I adopt here. So g shifts pro-form does into a pro-TVP, which is to say a constituent which distributes like a TVP but hosts a free pro-TVP meaning. Since, as we saw with the derivation of (6), all we need in what I'll call the "verb position" of the relative clause is a TVP, a TVP TVP may, naturally, occur in this position as well. This represents the key point of Jacobson (1992b) . Lifting Bill and then geaching the result twice allows it to combine with the TVP TVP : On this view, then, (5) is of category S TVP and denotes a function of type e, et , t which maps transitive relations to propositions. All other things being equal, the most contextually salient TVP here will be read-the c-commanding TVP in the above treeand so the gap is filled in accordance with our intuitions. Other TVPs may be made salient by pragmatic/discourse factors, and so the missing meaning need not always be supplied by the c-commanding TVP: 15 (7) (a) What if Nate tells i someone Emma's a cat lady? (b) Well I'll have to disabuse anyone he does ∅ i (of that mistaken notion).
On the intended reading of (7b), the missing meaning does not correspond to the denotation of the c-commanding TVP-λxλy[y disabuse x]-but rather to something like the transitive relation λxλy[y tell x Emma is a cat lady]. Depending on one's view of (7a)'s syntax, this latter meaning is either pragmatically controlled or supplied to (7b) across a sentence boundary.
Payoff: a binding account of ACD
Giving quantified phrases in object position a slightly special syntax and semantics allows the grammars described in both Szabolcsi (1992) and Jacobson (1999) to furnish binding accounts of ACD. Most syntactic-semantic theories need some "extra" piece of apparatus to account for quantified phrases in object position. In particular, some rule or set of rules needs to (a) resolve the type mismatch between transitive (and higher) typed verbs and quantified objects and (b) guarantee the grammatical availability of both surface and inverse scope readings in cases where both subject and object are quantified. The "standard" framework accomplishes this with QR. Another possibility is to allow quantifiers to shift from category (S/VP)/N to category (VP\TVP)/N via some type-shifter T :
The syntax and semantics of T are similar to those of geaching inside or gg, with two crucial exceptions. T reverses the directionality in which the quantified NP looks for its verbal argument. Specifically, whereas the input quantifier takes a noun to yield a rightwardlooking (i.e. subject-position) quantified NP, the output quantifier takes a noun to yield a leftward-looking (i.e. object-position) quantified NP. Moreover, whereas geaching would introduce some extra argument x which serves as the first argument of some functor R, T introduces an extra argument y which serves as the second argument of R.
Given T -every, we have everything we need for a binding account of ACD. In particular, z can shift T -every from category (VP\TVP)/N to category (VP\TVP)/N TVP :
So z-[T -every] looks to its right for a constituent of category N TVP -which is to say a noun which hosts a free pro-TVP meaning. It finds such a constituent in sentence (5) in the string book which Bill does: 
NP-S constructions
Unfortunately it's not the case that the syntax of NPs always works as neatly as we see here.
In particular, there exist constructions which seem difficult if not impossible to analyze with a Determiner-Noun syntax-the approach I've used here and which I'll refer to, following the literature, as "Det-Nom":
(8) Uni admires everyone Rori does.
Sentences like (8) present difficulties for most theories of syntax and semantics in that they appear to necessitate an NP-S analysis of the string everyone Rori does. Specifically, in (8) we lack any morphemically free noun which the relative clause Rori does could modifythe morphemically free noun in (5) is, of course, book. Moreover, given the semantics of quantified NPs as in e.g. Montague (1971) , it's difficult to see how everyone and Rori does could combine in a direct fashion and without splitting apart everyone into a Det-Nom-like structure. In short, it's not clear how to combine something of type et, t -the quantified NP everyone-with something of type e, t -the relative clause Rori does-and end up with another quantified NP.
I can only gesture at a possible solution which seems to hold some promise. Following Bach and Cooper (1978) and Cunningham (2007) , I posit a shift rule R to enable this sort of modification with lexicalized quantified NPs:
So R-everyone is of category (S/VP)/(S/NP). If T can apply to something of this category-which would require a generalized but intuitively plausible T rule 16 -it can shift by T to (VP\TVP)/(S/NP), and as before z will give us binding by shifting this to category (VP\TVP)/(S/NP) TVP and merging the relative clauses's free pro-TVP with the main clause's transitive verb.
In general, it would seem that most of the likely shift rules or alternative analyses for lexicalized quantified NPs which enable them to combine with relative clauses will also enable a binding analysis of their concomitant ACD constructions. In such analyses the quantified NP will need to able to take a relative clause to yield something of category S/VP.
17 The lexicalized generalized quantifier will therefore be of category (S/VP)/(S/NP) and will therefore be shiftable by T and then z, as we have just seen.
Loose ends
Astute readers may have noticed that the binding analysis of ACD seems to be incompatible with inverse scope in cases where both subject and object NPs are quantified. In particular, if the mechanism outlined here is the only means to a binding analysis of ACD, there should be no way to bind the ellipsis site of some man will read every book which John does other than by composing up read every book which John does into a VP whose denotation (roughly) matches that of the string read every book which John reads. Taking this as argument of the quantified subject some man yields surface scope.
The intuition at work here is that the object NP needs direct access to the TVP reads in order to achieve binding. Composing the subject NP and TVP-one possible strategy for achieving inverse scope in CCG-makes the TVP inaccessible to the VP\TVP. Furthermore, shifting the TVP to a higher type via a mechanism such as Hendriks Argument Lift (AR)-another inverse scope strategy-will re-introduce the type incompatibility that the T shift rule sought to resolve.
For my part, I find inverse scope readings of these sorts of ACD constructions relatively difficult to access. Nevertheless, they certainly appear to exist.
18 So the predicted unavailability of inverse scope represents a difficulty for the binding theory of ACD resolution offered here. In particular, within the framework developed above, the only binding derivations of ACD available to the grammar will evince surface scope, a peculiar asymmetry. I return to this later on, presenting a solution using Curry and Feys's S combinator, which has been argued to be independently motivated in the CCG literature.
Binding?
Having established the grammatical viability of both free and bound derivations of VP and TVP ellipsis constructions in CCG, it remains to be seen whether one approach is preferable to the other. This issue has been addressed in some of the literature on focus, most notably in Kratzer (1991) and Schwarz (2000) . Both Kratzer and Schwarz argue for a binding relationship between antecedent and elided VPs by adapting arguments which have been taken to support argument-reductive pronominal binding. 
Arguments for pronominal binding
Quantificational and across-the-board binding
The presence of argument-reductive binding mechanisms in any theory of syntax and semantics is motivated in part by the existence of pronouns with quantificational and/or multiple antecedents: (9) No man i loves his i mother.
(10) James i loves and Bobby j hates his i/j mother.
(11) Every man i loves but no man j marries his i/j mother.
In each of these cases the pronouns cannot receive proper denotations via "accidental" (i.e. free) co-reference. The pronominal in (9) simply does not, nor could it possibly, refer to any individual. As described above for (2), the free pronominal is instead bound to (i.e. merged with) the subject argument slot of loves to produce a VP which has as its meaning a function characterizing the following set: {x : love(mom(x))(x)}-in prose, the set of self's-mother-lovers.
In (10) and (11), moreover, the pronominal is bound by two different individuals and quantified NPs, respectively. These sorts of right-node-raising constructions are commonly referred to as across-the-board (ATB) binding. In both (10) and (11), as in (9), no individual could possibly serve as an antecedent for the pronominal on the intended reading. Indeed, positing some sort of "composite" individual as a pragmatically controlled antecedent for his in (10) plainly yields the wrong semantics. In particular, such a move requires that (10)'s reading be such that that James loves the composite individual's mother, whereas Bobby hates the composite individual's mother. However, (10) actually seems to mean that James loves James's mother, whereas Bobby hates Bobby's mother.
As it turns out, the apparatus described above-specifically g and z-offers a ready account of ATB binding constructions. The interested reader is referred to Jacobson (1996) for the full details. For our purposes it will suffice to briefly note how a proper semantics for (10) is arrived at via binding. First z applies to the transitive verb in each conjunct-loves and hates-to yield two constituents of category (S\NP)/NP NP . The subject NPs James and Bobby lift to generalized quantifiers of category S/(S\NP) and compose with the z'd verbs. Each of the conjuncts, then, is of category S/NP NP and denotes a function characterizing the set of e, e -type predicates. These two constituents conjoin via the semantics of generalized conjunction-cf. Partee and Rooth (1983) -combine with the NP NP his mother, and the derivation is home free. The same sort of strategy yields a semantically correct derivation for (11)-i.e. one where the pronominal is simultaneously bound by both quantified NPs.
The interaction of NP anaphora and focus-"bound focus" readings
Sentence (12) has two readings, which in turn correspond to two distinct ways to get Sue and she to co-refer:
(a) Sue is the only x who thinks Sue is smart.
(b) Sue is the only x who thinks x is smart.
In the framework we've been assuming, the category of she is NP NP -i.e. an NP with an unbound pronominal meaning. As before, geach (g) and lift (T) allow the pronominal gap to be passed up indefinitely. Here (12 ′ ) is of category S NP and denotes an open proposition-a function from individuals to propositional meanings:
If free meanings are picked up without focus marking, (12 ′ )-the free derivation of (12)'s X-node-denotes something like the following:
(13) SUE thinks Sue is smart
In an alternative semantics-cf. Rooth (1985) -every expression is associated with two values: (a) its "normal" denotation and (b) its focus value. The focus value for some expression ǫ is a set of alternative meanings derived by replacing every focus-marked constituent c in ǫ with the contextually salient alternatives to c. An item's normal denotation is generally included in its focus set.
So if the salient alternatives to Sue are Mary and Nate, SUE will be associated with the following focus set:
So on the free derivation, (12)'s X-node is associated with the following focus value:
Sue thinks Sue is smart, Mary thinks Sue is smart, Nate thinks Sue is smart
The semantics of only are such that for (12) to be true, none of the proper alternatives in the focus value of its X-node can be true. If (15) is the focus value associated with (12)'s X-node on the free derivation, only, by virtue of negating the proposition that Mary thinks Sue is smart and the proposition that Nate thinks Sue is smart, yields an assertion such that no one but Sue thinks Sue is smart-reading (a).
Binding offers another way to get SUE and she to "co-refer," one which, it turns out, is crucial for deriving the second reading of (12)-which I'll designate its "bound focus" reading. Specifically, we'll want to apply z to think:
z(think) takes a sentence with a free pronoun (i.e. she is smart) and binds that free pronoun to z(think)'s next NP argument:
On the bound derivation, thinks she is smart is of category VP and denotes a function characterizing the following set: {x : x thinks x is smart}. Combining this meaning with the alternatives to Sue in (14) yields the following focus value for (12)'s X-node:
Sue thinks Sue is smart, Mary thinks Mary is smart, Nate thinks Nate is smart    Here, the semantics of only guarantee that no one but Sue is an x who thinks x is smartreading (b). So binding mechanisms like z explain the existence of (12)'s "bound focus" reading.
Sloppy readings of elided VPs
The final major argument for a pronominal binding mechanism centers on the availability of so-called "sloppy" readings of pronominals in elided VPs. (17) has two readings. One is such that both Emma and Mary love Emma's mother-the "strict" reading. The other is such that both Emma and Mary love their own mothers-the "sloppy" reading. The problem, in short, is how to get the pronominal her in the elided VP to refer to Mary without violating some identity condition on ellipsis (cf. Sag (1976) , Williams (1977) )-or, alternatively, without violating Rooth (1992b)'s focus constraint on ellipsis. Given that the framework in which we're working doesn't allow for any intra-grammatical deletion or copying of structures or meanings under identity, I'll adopt the focus constraint in this exposition.
In most (if not all) instances of ellipsis, focus marking on some constituent in the ellipsis clause may be observed. Informally, Rooth's focus constraint on ellipsis requires that if some part of some sentence A serves as an antecedent for the elision of some part of some sentence B, A must be a member of B's focus set.
It's easy to see how Rooth's constraint is satisfied in the case of strict identity:
(18) Emma loves her i mother. MARY [ ∅ loves her i mother] too.
On (18), the pronoun in the ellipsis clause remains free and is associated with its antecedent via "accidental" co-reference. Assuming, as before, that free meanings are "picked up" without focus marking, the focus value of the ellipsis clause is {x : x loves Emma's mother}, for all x ∈ D c e , a contextually relativized universe of discourse. The proposition expressed by Emma loves Emma's mother is, of course, a member of this set, and so the focus constraint is satisfied.
For the focus constraint to be satisfied on the sloppy reading, the proposition expressed by Emma loves Emma's mother must be a member of the focus value associated with MARY j loves her j mother. As before, binding offers a straightforward way to accomplish this. Shifting loves by z allows loves her mother to denote a function characterizing the following set: {x : x loves x's mother}. It is this property that is elided in the second sentence of (18)-and which, therefore, has some pragmatic or discourse-salient antecedent.
21 Combining this meaning with the alternatives to Mary yields the following focus value for the ellipsis clause: {p : p = x loves x's mother}, for all x ∈ D c e . It is easily verified that the proposition expressed by Emma loves Emma's mother is a member of this set.
Extending these arguments to verb ellipsis
There do not seem to be constructions analogous to (9) which would enable us to argue for a binding relationship in cases of VP or TVP ellipsis. "Evidently," Schwarz (2000) notes, "the argument [for VP binding] cannot be based on cases with quantificational antecedents, for there do not seem to be verb phrases that are quantificational in the way quantificational noun phrases are." Schwarz's comments are likewise true for TVP ellipsis. In other words, since there don't seem to be any non-referring VP or TVP ellipsis sites analogous to nonreferring pronominals with quantificational antecedents, evidence that binding mechanisms underlie verb and VP ellipsis resolution will have to come from elsewhere. Kratzer (1991) and Schwarz (2000) , however, have argued that phenomena analogous to "bound focus" readings and and sloppy identity in VP ellipsis constructions provide strong evidence that binding mechanisms are in fact operative in VP ellipsis resolution. I review their arguments in the following section. Possible VPE and ACD analogs of sentence (10)-i.e. where a single pro-site is simultaneously bound by two VP or TVP expressions, respectively-will be explored in subsequent sections.
Ellipsis and focus
This section describes a series of tests presented in Schwarz (2000) and Kratzer (1991) which explore the interaction of VP ellipsis (VPE) with focus marking in a Roothian alternative semantics. In particular, Schwarz and Kratzer explore cases where a focus-marked VP-or, alternatively, a VP which is not itself focus-marked but which hosts some focused expression-serves as an antecedent for VPE. When such expressions are placed under the scope of focus-sensitive operators or constraints-i.e. only or, alternatively, Schwarz's Roothian construal of discursive "support"-intuitions about entailments and (in)felicity (respectively) will allow us to probe the contents of the expression's focus set. The formal characteristics of this set in turn provide substantial insight into the relationship between the antecedent and elided VPs. Following Rooth (1992b)'s focus constraint on ellipsis, Schwarz proposes a constraint such that for any discourse D comprised of sentences A and B in context c, if B contains focused material but is not itself focus-marked, D is admitted by c iff A "supports" B. Support is construed as a relation between two expressions A and B such that A supports B iff the ordinary value of A-let's call it "a"-is a member of the focus value associated with the meaning of B. This focus value-which we'll notate "B φ "-denotes a set of meanings calculated by replacing B's focus marked constituent(s) with alternative values.
The support constraint formalizes the intuition that in general the use of contrastive stress in some B expression seems to require a high degree of parallel structure between this expression and a previous utterance in the discourse context. In its strictest form, this guarantees that any sub-expression of B which subverts this parallelism must itself bear contrastive stress-cf. Rooth's focus constraint on ellipsis. Schwarz notes that it is necessary to weaken this framing of support to accommodate instances where c guarantees that a is sufficient for some meaning b f such that b f ∈ B φ . For example, one might deny an assertion that Mary is a linguist by saying, "No EMMA is a pedant" in a context where being a linguist guarantees that one is also a pedant. This distinction won't affect the analysis at hand, and the strict version of Schwarz's constraint will suffice.
Focused antecedents and VPE
The support constraint allows Schwarz to infer the contents of the focus values of sentences in which a focused VP serves as an antecedent for ellipsis:
(1) A. John left the party because he wanted to leave the party.
B. Actually, he (only) DANCED i because he wanted to ∅ i (2) A. John left the party because he wanted to make a phone call. B. #Actually, he (only) DANCED i because he wanted to ∅ i
Subscripts are used here and throughout only to highlight a particular reading and have no semantic or syntactic import-except where otherwise indicated. In both (B) sentences, although the ellipsis site may be understood as anaphoric to an extrasentential VP-i.e. to leave the party in (1A)-these readings will not be of interest to us. The relevant readings of (1B) and (2B) are such that the focused VP expression serves as the antecedent for ellipsis. Although discourses (1) and (2) host identical (B) expressions, (1B) is felicitous in its discourse context, whereas (2B) is intuitively not. The inclusion of only (given parenthetically above) seems to bring this out, but its semantic contributions will be largely ignored in this section. This should not affect any of the points made herein.
If the ellipsis site simply hosts an unfocused silent occurrence of dance-which would seem to make a degree of intuitive sense-the focus value of the resulting expression will contain propositions of the form John P past because he had to dance, with P a variable over the contextually salient alternatives to the property denoted by dance. It is easily verified that the proposition expressed by (1A) is not a member of this set. On this view, then, (1B) is incorrectly predicted to be infelicitous in its discourse context.
So the support constraint requires that the value of (1B)'s ellipsis site be variable across the members of (1B φ ). This is necessary to ensure that the proposition expressed by (1A)-namely that John left the party because he wanted to leave the party-is a member of (1B φ ). This may be accomplished simply by focus-marking the elided VP:
If the contextually salient alternatives to dancing are leaving the party and making a phone call, dance F is associated with the following focus value: (4) { dance, leave-party, make-phone-call } It follows that the subordinate clause of (3)-i.e. because he wanted to (dance F )-is associated with the following focus value:
In a Roothian alternative semantics, the focus value for the matrix VP dance F because he wanted to (dance F ) will reflect every possible combination (n = 9) of the members of (4) with the members of (5). This set may be defined as follows:
22 I ignore pronouns throughout this section. Here I assume a Derived-VP-like shift of the subordinate clause, which subsequently allows John to bind the referential pronoun.
23 I assume a VP-modifier semantics for because (a la Szabolcsi (1992) ) st. because = λpλP λx[because(p)(P )(x)].
(6) { VP : VP = λx[x P past because x wanted to Q]} P and Q represent variables over alternative VPs. Each member of (6) is subsequently predicated of John, resulting in the following focus value for (3):
(3 φ ) { S : S = John P past because John wanted to Q} It is easily verified that the proposition expressed by (1A)-namely, that John left the party because he wanted to leave the party-is a member of this set. In sum, representation (3) entails that (1a) ∈ (1B φ ) and thus that (1B) is supported in its discourse context.
Since (1B) and (2B) are identical expressions, (3) will also necessarily serve as a possible representation for (2B). However, (3 φ ) contains an alternative proposition s.t. John left the party because he wanted to make a phone call, which is exactly that proposition expressed by (2A). Since (2a) ∈ (3 φ ), (2B) is predicted to be supported in its discourse contextand thus to be felicitous. Indeed, the following dialogue, which echoes (2) and whose (B) expression represents a fully overt instantiation of (3), is perfectly admissible: (7) A. John left the party because he wanted to make a phone call.
B. Actually, he (only) DANCED because he wanted to DANCE.
In other words, representation (3) incorrectly predicts that (2B) will behave exactly like (7B) with respect to discursive support and thus that (2B) will be felicitous in its discourse context.
The generalization
Taken together, these facts suggests the following generalization (stated in transformational grammatical terms):
G1: There exists some surface representation r which entails the felicity of (1B) in (1). Furthermore, since (1B) and (2B) are identical, and since there exists no representation which entails the felicity of (2B) in (2), r must not entail the felicity of (2B) in (2).
The task, then, is to specify a representation or set of representations for (1B) and (2B) consistent with this generalization. Although (3) entails the felicity of (1B) in (1), since it likewise entails the felicity of (2B) in (2), it runs afoul of G1.
Tanglewood interlude
Sentences (1B) and (2B) are highly reminiscent of (in fact almost exactly analogous to) Kratzer (1991) Only maps an expression's normal and focus values into presupposed and asserted propositional content, respectively. In particular, only combines with some propositional meaning S and some focus set S φ to yield a presupposition equivalent to S plus an assertion equivalent to the conjunction of the negation of every proper alternative to S in S φ :
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For every S of type t associated with some S φ = {S, S alt1 , · · · , S altn }, only(S)(S φ ) yields a presupposition equivalent to S and an assertion F s.t. F = ¬S alt1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬S altn .
If only takes scope over its host sentence, (8) will have the following syntax:
The first thing to notice here is that the semantics of only, coupled with the intuition that (8) asserts both (8a) and (8b), entails that, like Schwarz's examples above, the ellipsis site must be variable in the alternatives associated with the S node of (8 ′ ). This is necessary, for example, to ensure that the proposition I went to Block island after you went to Block Island is a member of the S node's focus set, which in turn allows it to serve as part of the input to only. As before, we begin by simply focusing the NP in the elliptical VP:
The focus value associated with the S node of (9) is given by following set, where x and y range over all the contextually salient alternatives to Tanglewood: (10) { S : S = I went to x after you went to y} If the alternatives to Tanglewood are Block Island and Pawtuxet Village, the cardinality of (10) is 9, and its members reflect every possible way to assign alternative values to x and y. (10) will accordingly contain un-negated forms of (8a) and (8b). Applying (10) to only yields assertions equivalent to (8a) and (8b), et al. In other words, representation (9) works analogously to representation (3). Both yield focus sets which evince every possible pairing of the members of the set of alternative VPs/NPs with each other. However, (9)-like (3)-overgenerates. Intuitively, sentence (8) only entails that its speaker is not a copycat. It does not, for instance, assert the following proposition: This intuition militates against representation (9). The focus value associated with (9)'s S node contains alternative propositions evincing every possible combination of the focus sets associated with went to Tanglewood F and after you went to Tanglewood F . This set includes the following proposition:
(11) I went to Block Island after you went to Pawtuxet Village Since (11) ∈ (10) and furthermore since (11) represents a proper alternative to the proposition expressed by the S node of (9), representation (9) yields an assertion equivalent to the negation of (11). This is the same proposition expressed by (8c). So representation (9) entails that (8c) is asserted by (8)-an unacceptable result.
Summary
What we've been able to intuit about the felicity of (1B) and (2B) and the entailments of (8) seems to indicate that ellipsis sites need to be variable in the computation of focus values when their antecedents bear focus marking. The naive approach to this-simply focus-marking the elided constituent (or some proper part of this constituent, as in the Tanglewood sentence)-yields the wrong results in both instances: Representation (3) entails the felicity of (2B) in discourse (2), and representation (9) entails an assertion incompatible with what (8) seems to mean. In both cases the problem arises due to what I'll call "mixed" alternatives-that is, alternatives s.t. the antecedent and elided VP nodes dominate nonidentical denotations. This suggests the following generalization:
Condition (1) of G2 requires that for every sentential expression ǫ hosting a focus-marked VP which serves as an antecedent for ellipsis (or, alternatively, a VP which is not itself focusmarked but which hosts some focus-marked constituent A F ), and every contextually salient alternative property in a discourse context c, there exists some member Φ of the focus value ǫ φ s.t. its antecedent and ellipsis VP nodes both dominate that alternative property. This ensures that (1B) is felicitous in context and that (8) entails both (8a) and (8b). Condition (2) guarantees that no "mixed" alternatives are members of ǫ φ , which entails both the infelicity of (2B) and the incompatibility of (8c) with (8). G2 determines the following focus values for (1B)/(2B) and the S node of (8 ′ ):
(1,2B φ )    John danced because he wanted to dance, John left the party because he wanted to leave the party, John made a phone call because he wanted to make a phone call
I went to Tanglewood after you went to Tanglewood, I went to Block Island after you went to Block Island, I went to Pawtuxet Village after you went to Pawtuxet Village    6.4 How to get there- Kratzer (1991) In fact, these un-mixed focus sets are exactly what we observed before with respect to binding derivations of constructions with focused e-type pronominal antecedents. Kratzer's "Tanglewood" constructions, in particular, represent VPE analogs of the bound focus readings of sentences like only SUE i thinks she i is smart. Recall that binding-and the un-mixed focused sets it resulted in-allowed us to get the "bound focus" readings we observed for these cases. Furthermore, in §5.1.3 binding the pronominal in the elided VP guaranteed that the sloppy reading of the ellipsis clause obeyed Rooth's focus constraint on ellipsis by ensuring that the (co-indexed) denotation of antecedent clause was a member of the un-mixed focus set associated with the ellipsis clause. Schwarz and Kratzer discuss several ways to arrive at these "un-mixed" sorts of focus sets. Both note that treating the ellipsis site as a silent variable pro-VP which gets bound by some antecedent VP via the semantics of QR-exactly how this happens is fleshed out below-yields the correct focus sets. However, I turn first to Kratzer (1991) 's "strict" ellipsis account to give a sense of the sorts of commitments a "standard" theory of ellipsiswhich is to say, one which accounts for the syntactic and semantic properties of elliptical constructions by copying or deleting structure or meaning under some identity constraint (i.e. Sag (1976) , Williams (1977) )-will be forced to make. Kratzer (1991) enriches the syntactic ontology to include an additional set of variables, indices, and assignment functions. These indices result in an expanded range of possible focus markings-F1, F2, etc. We revise (8') accordingly:
Kratzer assumes a copy account of ellipsis such that the phonologically null meaning is specified as a silent variable at D-structure and remains "missing" at S-structure (the input to phonological form). The antecedent meaning is copied into the ellipsis site in the move from S-structure to LF (the input to the interpretation module): (13) Kratzer associates every expression with a so-called "presuppositional skeleton," which serves as a precursor to the expression's focus set. In a presuppositional skeleton, focused material is replaced with variables bearing integer indices inherited from the focus indices assigned at S-structure/LF: (14) only [ S I went to x 1 after you went to
Modulo indexical expressions, the meaning of (14)'s S-node is constant over assignment functions g but, crucially, non-constant over an alternative set of assignment functions h. Conversely, an expression's normal denotation is constant over h assignments since nothing receives h indices at that level of representation.
The h assignments have as their range D Here, h 1 (1) might be Tanglewood, and h 1 (2) might be Block Island. Alternatively, h 2 might map 1 and 2 onto the same NP. The focus value associated with (14)'s S-node is then defined as the set containing the string dominated by S evaluated with respect to every h assignment function:
Since both free variables bear the same h index, they will necessarily be mapped onto identical NPs by every h. Kratzer's focus-indexed account thus (correctly) yields the "unmixed" focus set given at the conclusion of the previous section.
The binding solution
Kratzer presents focus indexing as an alternative to movement-based accounts of the interaction of ellipsis and focus marking-which is to say QR/binding mechanisms work equally well. Both Kratzer and Schwarz show that binding gives a correct semantics for (1B), (2B), and (8). The binding account raises the antecedent VP at LF in order to take scope over a clause hosting its trace and a co-indexed silent pro-form at the ellipsis site:
"∆" denotes a silent VP-type pro-form, and "+" indicates a VP lifted over a function mapping VPs to propositions. The lifted VP is accordingly of type ett, t , and its meaning is given by λf et,t [f (go(Tanglewood))].
So these lifted VPs bind pro-forms and traces analogously to canonical examples of QR. Binding therefore obviates the need for focus indexing. By allowing the focus-marked VP to scope out at LF, Schwarz guarantees that the alternative values for the two bound constituents will necessarily vary in tandem:
Taking the cross-product of these two sets yields the correct "un-mixed" focus set.
Sloppy identity: a puzzle for the strict elliptical account
Having a binding mechanism for elliptical constructions allows Schwarz to move away from a so-called "strictly elliptical" account-that is, one which explains ellipsis only in terms of deletion or copying of material under identity. Kratzer's focus-indexed account is strictly elliptical in that it explains "silent VPs" solely in terms of a copy operation which applies between S-structure and LF. Schwarz points out that constructions wherein an ellipsis site is anaphoric to both intraand extra-sentential material pose substantial difficulties for strictly elliptical accounts:
(18) A: When John had to cook he didn't want to. B: When he had to CLEAN he didn't ∅ (either).
In particular, (18B) has a sloppy reading such that the ellipsis is understood as (roughly) equivalent to want to clean. Furthermore, this reading is intuitively felicitous in its discourse context. In Kratzer's framework this suggests the following LF: As Schwarz notes, the problem for representation (19) is that (19B)'s elided VP-want to clean F 1 -does not seem to have any suitable linguistic antecedent. In other words, the copy operation will be forced to break apart the bracketed VP in (19A)-want to cook-in order to "get at" want to so that it can be copied into the ellipsis site of (19B). This represents a power not usually attributed to the ellipsis mechanism, and for good reason-Schwarz notes that it overgenerates:
(20) A: When John had to cook he didn't want to cook. B: When he had to CLEAN he didn't ∅ (either).
(19B) lacks the "sloppy" reading denoted in (19B), which is to say that ∅ can in (20B) only be understood as want to cook. But why should this be the case? If the copy operation can break apart want to [ ∅ cook] in (19A), it should similarly be able to copy want to into (20B). Therefore we would expect (20B) to have same range of readings-strict and sloppy-as does (19B). This is, however, clearly not the case.
Schwarz's solution
In contrast to the strictly elliptical account, Schwarz's binding account easily accommodates the sloppy reading of (18) without predicting a sloppy reading for (20). This is apparent if we look at the LFs which arise for (18) on Schwarz's system:
Schwarz relies on two mechanisms in order to obtain the relevant reading of (22B). That want to ∆ 1 in (22B) may be copied from the LF of (22A) follows without stipulation-N.B. Schwarz doesn't do away with ellipsis; he supplements it with binding. QR/binding allows cook and clean F to bind their respective traces and pro-forms, and this results in the correct "un-mixed" focus set for (22B). In sum, since representation (22) does not force Schwarz to posit a more relaxed constraint on ellipsis, he avoids over-generating with respect to (20).
Furthermore, as Schwarz points out, the strict and sloppy readings readings of (18B) are exactly analogous to the two readings observed in §5.1.3, Example (17) (repeated here in slightly modified form as discourse (23) (18) A: When John had to cook i he didn't want to ∅ i . B: When he had to CLEAN he didn't ∅ (either).
In each of the strict readings of the B sentences, the pro-form remains free within its host clause. In each of the sloppy readings, the pro-form is bound by an intra-sentential antecedent. As seen in §5.1.3, binding allows the pro-form hosted in the elided VP to "refer to" its B antecedent while still satisfying Rooth's focus constraint on ellipsis and Schwarz's related construal of support. Specifically, binding gurarantees that the denotation of the A sentence-on which the pro-form and its intra-sentential antecedent co-refer-will be a member of the un-mixed focus value associated with the B sentence.
7 A variable-free CCG binding account
What z gets us
Kratzer's "Tanglewood" constructions-i.e. I only went to TANGLEWOOD after you didare readily accounted for with the CCG apparatus given in §3.2 for binding analyses of VPE. Since after takes a sentence to yield a VP modifier and is accordingly of category (VP\VP)/S, a binding derivation here involves little more than applying z to after:
Here z merges after's VP argument slot with the unbound pro-VP hosted in the S VP you did. The antecedent and ellipsis site will then necessarily co-vary in the focus value associated with the VP went to TANGLEWOOD after you did. In particular, this focus value will look as follows:
The semantics of only in turn guarantees that the resulting sentence asserts the negation of all proper alternatives to I went to Tanglewood after you went to Tanglewood in the set {p : p = I went to x after you went to x, for all x ∈ D c e }.
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Furthermore, the CCG binding account readily explains the felicity and infelicity of the following Schwarz (2000) dialogues:
On the bound derivation of (1B) and (2B)-which is such that we apply z to because-the focus set associated with each expression will necessarily be of the form {p : p = John P past because John wanted to P past , for all P ∈ D c e }. Binding derivations thus guarantee that (1B) will be supported in its discourse context and that (2B) will not, since the proposition expressed by (1A) will be a member of (1B φ ), and the proposition expressed by (2B) will not be a member of (2B φ ), respectively.
A new piece
However, a binding treatment of a subset of Schwarz's cases-specifically the sorts of constructions he uses to argue for sloppy identity readings-will require a bit of extra apparatus. Sentence (24), which is reminiscent the Schwarz's potentially sloppy (B) sentences-i.e. (18)-but which does not elide want to, will make it clear why this is the case: (24) If Uni has to CLEAN, she won't want to.
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If if is of category (S 3 /S 2 )/S 1 and denotes the function λp 1 λp 2 [if (p 1 )(p 2 )], its second argument, rather than its first, is where the unbound pro-form-the S VP -is to be found. We know this because, given our mono-stratal CCG syntax, if may access the S VP she won't want to only after combining with its first propositional argument-i.e. Uni has to CLEAN.
27 I've included integer subscripts on the category label and denotation to help make this clear.
This binding configuration represents a mirror image of what z can do. Specifically, z shifts some 2(+)-place functor f so as to bind a free pro-form at f 's first argument slot:
So we need something like a mirror image of z for such cases. In fact, Curry and Feys's S combinator yields the correct sort of binding configuration when applied to some 2(+)-place functor f :
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The S rule
S is familiar from the CCG literature. Steedman (1987) and Russell (2005) adopt it to account for parasitic gap constructions in English. Additionally, Barker (2005) uses S to provide a variable-free binding account of binding-out-of-DP configurations. The particular S rule given here is a unarized version of the forward substitution rule explored in Steedman (1987) . Furthermore, the version of S given here is structured so as to make the "binder" argument (i.e. the λ-bound x) more accessible in the course of the derivation, in particular by making it Sf 's first argument rather than its second (as is usually the case).
29 However, nothing crucial hinges on this here. The binder argument need not be made more accessible for the analysis proposed below to go through. Doing so, however, aids in the exposition by allowing the derivations to fit together with a minimum of liftings and geachings.
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To derive the bound analysis of (24), we begin by composing if Uni has to:
S next applies to this constituent, as follows:
27 I'm ignoring, for the purposes of this analysis, the possibility of a wrap operation, which has been argued for in e.g. Dowty (1982a) and Jacobson (1992) , among others 28 Indeed, Jacobson's z is so-named because it represents a "flip-flopped" version of S. 29 This reordered S is adopted, for instance, in Barker (2005) . 30 In fact, using the un-modified S forces us, as the reader may verify, to make use of the crossed composition rule <Bx, a non-order-preserving combinator, but one which has been independently motivated for English in Steedman (1987) and Steedman (2000) , among others.
So applying S to if Uni has to merges the VP argument of the (S/S)/VP if Uni has to with the pro-VP hosted in she won't want to, which (ignoring pronouns for expository ease) is of category S The above tree instantiates S as a silent syntactic operator, but this is only for the sake of representational convenience-I do not intend any ontological commitments regarding S's syntactic status.
31 The denotation of the S/S VP node in this derivational tree is given by the following function:
Combining this meaning with the S VP she won't want to-N.B. want to has shifted from a VP/VP to a VP VP , and this VP superscript has been passed up-yields a proposition (roughly) equivalent to that expressed by if Uni has to clean, she won't want to clean. Note, moreover, that the argument-reductive nature of binding ensures that (24)'s focus value will only contain un-mixed alternatives, which, recalling Schwarz's data, seems to be the correct result:
(24 φ ) {p : p = if Uni has to P she won't want to P, for all P ∈ D c e,t }
Strict and sloppy pro-VP identity
With this apparatus, we have all we need to give an analysis of Schwarz's strict and sloppy pro-VP cases. Recall Schwarz's construction, given above as (18) and repeated here as (25) in slightly modified form and with if replacing when:
(25) A: If John has to cook he won't want to.
B: If he has to CLEAN he won't ∅ (either).
Deriving the sloppy reading
We begin with the sloppy reading. Given the support constraint, we know that the proposition expressed by (25A)-which is (roughly) equivalent to that expressed by if John has to cook, he won't want to cook-will need to be a member of the focus value associated with (25B). Schwarz showed us that the most straightforward way to ensure this was with binding, which guarantees that (25B)'s focus value will only contain un-mixed alternatives (and thus the proposition expressed by (25A). Deriving a binding analysis of (25) looks slightly hairy, but really requires nothing more than a fairly mundane series of geachings and liftings. To begin, we apply S to if John has to (as before) and combine the result with the VP clean:
if John has to (S/S)/VP : λP λq[if(has-to(P )(j))(q)]
To derive he won't on the understanding such that what's missing isn't actually a full VP but rather a VP VP -i.e. want to-we geach won't and combine the result with the NP John (ignoring the unbound pronominal), which requires lifting John and geaching the result twice:
The constituents derived in these two derivations may subsequently compose, thereby passing up the free pro-VP VP in he won't and binding off its free VP superscript (i.e. that of the S VP ):
if John has to clean
In other words, the derivation binds off the pro-VP in the "consequent" clause but allows the missing (i.e. superscripted) VP VP to be passed up. So our resulting sentence is in fact of category S VP VP and denotes a function from VP VP -type meanings-specifically, control-verb-like meanings-to propositions.
The CCG account of sloppy identity in these cases, then, is exactly analogous to Schwarz'sand likewise, then, analogous to the way that we arrive at sloppy pronominal identity in certain ellipsis constructions. In the (B) sentence here, clean binds a pro-VP at the ellipsis site, and the resulting sentence hosts a free VP VP -type pronoun, which is to say that the denotation of want to is supplied here by the same mechanisms which underlie non-binding ellipsis resolution generally. Schwarz's account is parallel. There, on the sloppy reading clean binds a (syntactically instantiated) pro-VP at the ellipsis site, and want to is supplied by the same mechanisms which underly ellipsis resolution generally (i.e. copying or deleting material under some notion of identity): (22) 
Deriving the strict reading
On the strict reading, the free pro-VP meaning in the ellipsis site is not bound intrasententially but, rather, remains free within its host clause. Deriving (25B) in this way yields a constituent of category (S VP ) VP VP . In other words, both of the free pronominals (i.e. the superscripted VP VP and the superscripted VP) are passed up all the way to the level of the sentence. So deriving the strict reading involves two instances of anaphoric resolution by the processor. Specifically, the processor first searches for a contextually salient VP VPtype meaning-i.e. want to-and then for a contextually salient VP-type meaning-i.e. cook from (25A). This results in a reading of (25B) roughly equivalent to that of if John has to clean, he won't want to cook.
On the other hand, we might be able to tell a pragmatic story in the vein of Webber (1978) such that, to arrive at the strict reading, (25B) need only compose up to an S VP . The VP-type meaning of want to cook, then, is picked up directly from the discourse context by the processor. Indeed, the sort of story Schwarz would be inclined to tell for the strict case would involve a full VP want to cook sitting in (25B)'s ellipsis site which elides by virtue of being sufficiently identical to another full VP want to cook in (25A): 
Lack of sloppy identity in certain contexts
Schwarz's key argument against an ellipsis-only account of these sloppy identity cases hinged on the following minimal pair: (18) A: When John had to cook he didn't want to. B: When he had to CLEAN he didn't ∅ (either).
In particular, the puzzle for the strictly elliptical account was why (18) had a sloppy reading that (20) lacked. Within the framework I've assumed, the account I'd be inclined to offer is such that (20B) doesn't categorically lack a sloppy reading. Rather, the sloppy reading is highly unsalient. 32 The reason for this, I would argue, has to do with what sorts of strings have in fact been overtly instantiated. I propose that denotations associated with overtly instantiated constituents-i.e. the meaning of want to cook in (20A)-will in general be relatively salient for the processor. Moreover, the processor will be relatively reluctant to break apart a string associated with a single model-theoretic object in order to access any denotations which might be associated with any of its proper parts. Since a strict reading of (20B) involves less breaking down than a sloppy reading, the sloppy reading is predicted to be relatively unsalient. On the other hand, a sloppy reading of (18B) will involve no more break-down than a strict reading, since no full VP corresponding to want to cook has been instantiated in (18A).
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This sort of story seems to possess some intuitive value, but in any case it will have to be confirmed with further research. Nevertheless, it closely echoes Schwarz's argument against the ellipsis account of (18B)'s sloppy reading. Schwarz, we recall, was reluctant to allow the ellipsis mechanism to break apart want to cook in (20A) in order to get at want to, a step which would have allowed for a strict reading of (20B). Schwarz's reluctance had to do with the over-generative capacity associated with such an ellipsis mechanism. The preliminary account offered here seems merely to be restating Schwarz's argument in processing rather than grammatical terms.
Scope alternations and ACD binding
It's time to cash out a promissory note. In §4.2.5 we noted that the apparatus proposed for a binding account of ACD only seemed to generate derivations evincing surface scope. It turns out that S allows us to derive inverse scope in ACD binding cases straightforwardly. Here I provide here a derivation, using S, for ACD binding with inverse scope. The derivation makes crucial use of one additional (though highly natural and closely related to typeraising) piece of machinery due to Hendriks (1987)-Argument Lift (AR), presented here in a simplified form:
AR allows a functor f which wants some argument of type τ to shift into a functor ARf , which may then combine with P, an argument of type τ lif t .
(25) Someone read every book John did.
We begin the derivation by geaching someone and continue by applying AR "inside"-an operation which, the reader may verify, is isomorphic to geaching AR:
The resulting category and denotation shift by S:
33 Processors, moreover, may in general be more amenable to breaking apart sentences to "get at" VPs than to breaking apart VPs to get at TVPs. What sorts of general principles this might follow from I leave as an open question.
34 As it turns out, scope alternations between quantified subjects and objects fall out of a generalized AR. Since here I've adopted another mechanism to achieve scope alternations-in particular, a different sort of quantified object-adopting AR for a case like (25) might seem to unduly complicate our fragment solely in order to deal with one type of construction. However, Barker (2005) argues that AR is crucial for certain binding configurations which have nothing to do with scope alternations. I take this as at least preliminary evidence that the account here isn't helping itself to too much machinery.
The resulting constituent takes a transitive verb to yield something which wants something of category S/(S\NP)) TVP to its right-which is to say a generalized quantifier hosting an unbound pro-TVP meaning:
The generalized quantifier with the unbound pro-TVP-which corresponds to argument g in the semantics-has been merged with the TVP-type argument slot of λRλx[someone(Rx)].
The derivation concludes by combining the above expression with the (S/(S\NP)) TVP every book John did to yield the following denotation, which gives the quantified object wide scope:
(26) (every book John read)(λx[someone(read(x))]) 7.5 Wrap-up and a small proposal regarding weak crossover
To sum up, we've recast Schwarz's QR binding account in CCG, in particular by adding a unary shift rule S to our fragment. S has been argued to be independently motivated in Steedman (1987) , Russell (2005) , and Barker (2005) (inter alia), although it is generally used only to effect NP binding. Jacobson (1999) , however, notes that a freely applying S yields violations of weak crossover, as follows (A denotes the apply inside operation, which as we saw before was definable in terms of geach and lift): The solution I wish to gesture at is simple and stipulative, although it may hold some promise. Weak crossover violations tend to arise when we allow S to apply to transitive and higher-order verbs. I propose simply that we define S such that its domain does not include verbs-i.e. things of category ((S\NP)/...)/X, with X a variable over categories.
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Doing so eliminates derivations like that given for (27) above, thereby ruling out crossover configurations and obviating one of the major worries associated with S (although facts about crossover may ultimately follow less stipulatively from more fundamental grammatical principles-see, for instance, Shan and Barker (2005) ).
"Free" focus
As we've seen, both Schwarz and Kratzer assume that "unmixed" focus sets are the only kinds which result when a focused VP serves an antecedent for VP ellipsis. This doesn't, however, seem quite right:
(28) A: You are so pedantic at track meets. You're always following me around, doing whatever I'm doing. And you can't ever leave it that, either. Not only are you a copycat but you insist on outdoing me every chance you get. At yesterday's meet, after I pole-vaulted, you pole-vaulted and somersaulted. After I sprinted, you sprinted and did jumping jacks. B: In general, I suppose you're right. But here's a counterexample: Yesterday, [I only RAN i after you did ∅ i ]. I didn't run and try to juggle or anything like that.
In this (heavily loaded) context, the bracketed sentence in (28B) seems to mean something like running is the only P such that I P past when you ran. 36 I call this the "free focus" reading.
If, as was the case with focused antecedents for pronominals in §5.1.2, we assume that free meanings are picked up by the processor without focus marking, the denotation of (28B)'s bracketed sentence on a free derivation will be something like the following:
(29) I only RAN when you ran
The semantics of only guarantees that none of the proper alternatives to the proposition expressed by I ran when you ran in the set {p : p = I P past when you ran, for all P ∈ D c e,t } are true-the intuitively correct reading in this context.
The meaning in (29) is exactly analogous to the aforementioned "free focus" readings of constructions like only SUE thinks she's smart. In both cases the inherited contextually salient meaning does not carry focus marking. Therefore the pronoun and the ellipsis site remain constant in the focus alternatives associated with their respective expressions, and the application of only yields the following readings:
(30) Sue is the only x such that x thinks Sue is smart run is the only P such that I P past when you ran.
Compare these to the "bound" readings, which result from un-mixed focus sets due to argument-reductive binding:
(31) Sue is the only x such that x thinks x is smart run is the only P such that I P past when you P past .
Thus, I argue, the existence of "free focus" readings supports the general view of VP ellipsis as anaphora resolution. Conversely, if we buy that VP ellipsis is like pronominal anaphora, we'd be surprised if we didn't get the free-focus readings. Since any theory of anaphora will have to explain the "free focus" readings of constructions where a focused NP serves as a pronominal's antecedent, "free focus" VPE readings will fall out from the most general version of any account of VPE as anaphora.
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36 Several informants confirm that this reading is available. 37 Note, moreover, that these "free" derivations don't undermine any of Schwarz's empirical generalizations. In particular, with respect to each of Schwarz's dialogues, though "free focus" derivations are predicted infelicitous in their respective discourse contexts (i.e. since the proposition expressed by John cooked because he wanted to cook is not in the focus set associated with John CLEANED because he wanted to clean), dialogues whose (B) sentences are felicitous only require that there exists some derivation of the (B) sentence which satisfies the support constraint.
These data seem problematic for Kratzer (1991) 's indexed treatment of focus marking. Kratzer analyzes ellipsis by appealing to a copy operation which represents part of the move from S-structure to LF. However, the copy operation and focus indexing, taken together, incorrectly predict that elided material will necessarily bear the same focus index as its antecedent and therefore that the only readings of sentences like (28B) will be "bound focus" readings. Schwarz's account, on the other hand, might be brought in line with "free focus" readings by allowing unfocused material to elide whether its antecedent is focused or not:
(32) I only ran F when you ran To sum up, "free focus" readings of VPE and NP anaphora constructions follow from three assumptions: (a) binding accounts for "bound" focus readings by generating un-mixed focus sets, (b) contextually supplied meanings account for "free" focus readings, and (c) contextually supplied meanings do not host focus marking.
ATB ellipsis
I conclude by noting the existence of certain across-the-board (ATB) ellipsis constructions which seem somewhat marginal but which are, nevertheless, tolerated by myself and most informants with whom I've consulted: In each of these constructions, an ellipsis site or pronominal is simultaneously anaphoric to two separate pieces of intra-sentential syntax. As we observed with the pronominal case, positing a "composite" individual as a pragmatically controlled antecedent for his yields the wrong semantics, since on the indicated reading (35) seems to be saying that James loves James's mother, and Bobby hates Bobby's mother. Similarly, (33) seems to require that Nate ran when Frank ran, and Emma jumped when Frank jumped, and (35) seems to require that John had to print every document we neglected to print, and Mary had to file every document we neglected to file. Thus, just as the pronoun in (35) could not be analyzed referentially, neither may the ellipsis sites in (33) and (34).
The CCG apparatus assumed here offers a ready analysis of (34). The derivation of (33) is slightly complicated in that it seems to require a combinator like Curry and Feys's/Szabolcsi's W.
39 I present the binding derivation for (34) below (ignoring the control predicate had to for expository convenience).
We begin by deriving John printed, as follows:
38 The degree to which some informant tolerates these constructions may be positively correlated with the degree to which s/he tolerates RNR in general. 39 The semantics of W-specifically, of the W that would help us here-may be given as λf λxλy[f xxy]. ... 
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The derivation thus guarantees that (34) means that John had to print every document we neglected to print, and Mary had to file every document we neglected to file.
Conclusion
This paper has presented two distinct mechanisms for anaphora resolution-one within the grammar and one without-largely within the variable-free CCG framework of Jacobson (1999) . It has been argued that these mechanisms underlie verb ellipsis resolution in addition to NP anaphora resolution. Following Schwarz (2000) and Kratzer (1991) , I have presented evidence arguing for the necessity of a binding analysis of VP ellipsis in order to account for effects resulting from the interaction of ellipsis and focus. I have, moreover, presented a binding account of ACD resolution, one which will allow us to give a proper semantics for sentences such as I only READ every book that you did-i.e. such that read is the only transitive relation R such that I R past every book that you R past .
It has further been shown that certain constructions due to Schwarz (2000) require us to add the S combinator to our CCG fragment. S is independently motivated elsewhere in the CCG literature and, in addition to furnishing a non-movement account of each of Schwarz's cases, also allows for inverse-scope ACD binding and ultimately yields a straightforward account of so-called ATB ACD constructions. Moreover, I have proposed that the weakcrossover-related worries associated with S are obviated by restricting its application.
Finally, I've argued that the existence of "free focus" readings in certain VPE constructions offers a striking parallel to the "free focus" readings of constructions like only SUE i thinks she i is smart. Combined with Schwarz's insight that pro-VPs hosted in ellipsis sites may in certain circumstances have both strict and sloppy interpretations, this offers compelling evidence that similar mechanisms underlie both verb ellipsis and NP anaphora.
